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 Traditionally many fabless companies outsource the fabrication of IC design 
to the foundries, which may not be trusted always. In order to ensure trusted 
IC’s it is more significant to develop an efficient technique that detects the 
presence of hardware Trojan. This malicious insertion causes the logic 
variation in the nets or leaks some sensitive information from the chip, which 
reduces the reliability of the system. The conventional testing algorithm for 
generating test vectors reduces the detection sensitivity due to high process 
variations. In this work, we present a compressive sensing approach, which 
can significantly generate optimal test patterns compared to the ATPG 
vectors. This approach maximizes the probability of Trojan circuit activation, 
with a high level of Trojan detection rate. The side channel analysis such as 
power signatures are measured at different time stamps to isolate the Trojan 
effects. The effect of process noise is minimized by this power profile 
comparison approach, which provides high detection sensitivity for varying 
Trojan size and eliminates the requirement of golden chip. The proposed test 
generation approach is validated on ISCAS benchmark circuits, which 
achieves Trojan detection coverage on an average of 88.6% reduction in test 
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The presumption of fabricated ICs not being subjected to any trade off in security was present for a 
long time. To lower the fabrication costs, third party fabrication industries are involved in the production of 
SoC (System on Chip). Some of these foundries may act as an adversary and might insert malicious circuitry 
into the chips during the fabrication process.These additional modules are efficiently designed such that they 
evade detection during post manufacturing tests and are deployed in field application. The malicious  
IP-Cores apart from corrupting the functionality of the SoC may cause consequences in the fields which 
require extreme information security such as defence, medicine and communication. To reduce the 
vulnerability of the SoC, hardware security and Trojan detection are incorporated to safeguard and protect  
the sensitive designs. 
Hardware security involves the major research areas such as detection and diagnosis of hardware 
Trojans along with design of secured hardware. Classification of Hardware Trojans and various threats are 
analyzed in [1]. The lack of availability of golden chips as a reference circuit is the main challenge for the 
researchers to detect the Trojan. The Hardware Trojan has been classified [2] into three different types as an 
internal trigger, storage and Hardware Trojan driver. Wang et al. developed an elaborate hardware Trojan 
taxonomy in [3] which categorized the Trojans into physical, activation and action characteristics. In [4] the 
activation mechanism is further categorized into digital and analog Trojans. The impact of digital Trojan may 
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affect the logic values of the specified internal node or it may also alter the stored content in the memory 
unit. The performance, power and noise margins are the parameter which gets affected due to the analog 
payload Trojan. In-order to secure the vulnerable system, the researchers mainly focuses on activation 
mechanism of Trojan circuit. The activation mechanism includes transition probability based Trojan 
triggering [5], in which the node selection technique for the Trojan insertion is proposed for detection 
process. To ensure the presence of Trojan module using conventional testing approach triggers the internal 
nodes and propagation of logic variations in the nets due to Trojan effects to the payload must be enhanced. 
The problem of detecting the Trojan module using conventional test vector approach is a challenging task for 
extracting Trojan triggering vectors by taking fault masking logic into consideration. In addition, the  internal 
nodes and Trojan triggers are dependent factors, which indicates instead of conventional testing, 
a compressive sensing approach for sparse test pattern generation for triggering the Trojans are formulated in 
a  feasible manner. 
In the proposed work, an optimal test pattern generation technique using compressive sensing 
approach has been attempted to aid in the detection of hardware Trojan.The proposed compressive sensing 
approach is performed on the input patterns to provide optimal test patterns that can distinguish a Trojan 
infected chip from a golden chip. This approach is performed to extract the Trojan triggering test vectors thet 
are rare and is also sparse. Thus by attempting the proposed compressive sensing approach, the sparsity of 
the test vectors is achieved and can effectively determine the revealing test patterns from the large pool of 
test vector space. This approach generates compact test set, which minimizes the time complexity for testing, 
while maximizing the probability of Trojan detection coverage. The transition probability algorithm is 
formulated to extract the significant internal nodes in the net-list for insertion of Trojan module. The main 
insight of measuring the power profile in our work is to classify the IC is Trojan free if the power signature is 
constant and Trojan infected if it has some anomaly at different time instances. Simulation results shows that 
the proposed compressive sensing approach is effectively used for detecting both combinational as well as 
sequential Trojans. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the state-of-the-art techniques for 
hardware Trojan detection schemes and challenges based on compressive sensing techniques. The Proposed 
compressive sensing based test set approach for detection Trojan module is presented in Section 3.  
The Simulation results for various ISCAS benchmark circuit with detailed observations is described in 




Hardware Trojans are embedded into the original finite state machine by the Trojan design 
engineers by composing a high level design description of the Trojan. Thus a Trojan FSM is injected by 
merging their states with the original design and is indistinguishable from the functionality  
of the golden chip. This method of Trojan insertion will hide the presence of Trojan and is hard to detect by 
the conventional authentication techniques. The countermeasures against these Trojans are classified into two 
types such as detection and design for trust. 
 
2.1. Detection 
The hardware Trojan detection is developed in the hardware security community and are broadly 
categorised into destructive and non- destructive [4] as shown in the Figure 1. The destructive approach is 
analysed to verify the chip design by an optical method. Thus the chip is examined layer by layer in this 
method and each chip is to be tested individually. Hence this approach is applicable only for the IC’s which 
is fabricated under untrusted foundry. The requirement of specialized equipment and the cost are the major 
limitations of this analysis. The non-destructive approach is analysed by considering the characteristic 
behaviour of the chip and the presence of Trojan is identified by mapping with the examined profile. 
This method of hardware Trojan is further classified into three types such as design time approach, run time 





Figure 1. Classification of Hardware Trojan detection [4] 
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2.1.1. Design approach 
A pre-silicon method of hardware Trojan detection is employed in this approach, which detects the 
threats associated with intellectual property (IP). A hardware Trojan module is inserted to the design of 
golden IP without the designer’s knowledge and these Trojans behaviour will be hidden during normal 
verification test. The design time approach is further divided into formal verification and design for security. 
The process of property checking is a formal verification, in which the IP properties of the design under test 
are analysed with the original reference IP. In paper [6] proposed a method for diagnosis which locates the 
malicious module in the third party IP. The isolation of infected third party IP from the authentic one is 
experimentally proved in this method and the location of Trojan module is also effectively identified only 
when the Trojan are triggered. Hardware Trojans internal and external activation delivers the character of 
Trojan module and its various types of activation mechanism are listed in [7]. The triggering input of the 
Trojan circuit is independent from the original circuit and it is represented as always on Trojan.  
 
2.1.2. Runtime approach 
The run time approaches are used to detect to detect the Trojan by inserting a sensor module to the 
original chip and the activity of the IC’s are continuously monitored. The variation in the characteristics of 
the chip under test from the expected reference characteristics will indicate the presence of malicious module. 
A hybrid method of run time is proposed [8], which combines a design time component with the run time 
monitoring such as blue chip. An on-line monitoring approach of hardware Trojan detection  
is proposed in [9], which mainly focuses on original functionality of the circuit and detects any variation 
from the expected logic values at the suspected internal nodes. A Two rail checker module are developed and 
inserted in the system to monitor the logic malfunction in its vicinity. 
 
2.1.3. Test time approach 
The presence of malicious module is detected in test time approach during post manufacturing 
process. The test time approaches are classified into two types such as functional testing approach and side 
channel analysis. The presence of Trojan changes the functionality of the design is detected using logic 
verification known as functional testing approach [10]. The main drawback of this method is that the Trojan 
inserted will not alter the functionality of the circuit until it is triggered. Compressive sensing technique is an 
emerging methodology which is related with the functional testing approach [11].  
 
2.2. Design for trust 
The design for security techniques is applicable for designing the structure in-order to enhance the 
level of security in hardware. The design for security is classified such as logic encryption, IC camouflaging, 
split manufacturing and Trojan activation. In paper [12], proposed a design methodology in which the IP’s 
are protected by obfuscating the original net-list. In this technique, the normal mode of operation is possible 
only when the valid key is provided to the key gates where the delay and area are the main constrains.  
S. Dupuis, et al., [13, 14] proposed an encryption algorithm which minimises the number of rare occurrence 
values of the internal node. In this logic encryption technique, the probability of all the internal nodes is 
computed in-order to identify the low controllability nodes. The proposed method overcomes the above 
specified drawbacks and also protects the IC’s from illegal over production. A several key technologies 
associated with network security are proposed in paper [15], which satisfies the computational security aspect 
in electronic voting, data mining and other fields. The split manufacturing [16] technique is applicable in 
layout level in which the original design is split into two layers and it is fabricated under different foundries. 
The adversary cannot access the complete details of the split design and hence the inserting a Hardware 
Trojan is not possible in this technique. 
 
 
3. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
The main goal of the proposed methodology is to generate the test patterns that can excite the  
Trojan triggering nodes more effectively. The Probability distribution of each net in the circuit under test is 
calculated in order to determine the extra Trojan gate in the IC. The Hardware Trojan detection using 
proposed methodology is shown in Figure 2. 
 
3.1. Reduced Test set Generation using CS 
Algorithm 1 describes the major steps in the proposed generation of optimal test vectors for Trojan 
detection. The gate level net-list is considered as the input file for the conventional ATPG tool. The test 
vectors obtained from the ATPG are further compressed using proposed compressive sensing algorithm.  
The input signal to the compressive sensing algorithm must be sparse in any domain. The sparsity of the 
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signal is achieved by incorporating basis matrix (Ψ) to the input, which converts the signal in one domain to 
another domain where it is sparse. Thus, the N number of test patterns generated from ATPG is further 
compressed into M number of test patterns (M<<N) after compressive sensing (CS). The result of the 
proposed CS pattern generation method is a optimal test set that identifies the presence of Trojan and also 





Figure 2. Proposed hardware Trojan detection flow 
 
 
Algorithm 1. Generate reduced test set using compressive sensing for Trojan Detection 
Input: Circuit Net-list, list of random patterns (T), constant(c), list of node (R).  
Output: Reduced test patterns (Tc).  
1. Read the circuit net- list. 
2. for all random patterns in T do 
3.       Compute the sparsity parameter k 
4. Compute M with c as constant values  
5. 𝑀 ≥ 𝑐 ∗ 𝑘 ∗ log⁡(𝑇/𝑘) 
6. Compute Minimal value of M<N. 
7. Generate Φ matrix € M x N. 
8.    for all bits in T do 
9.       Compute reduced setTc 
10. Tc= Φ matrix * T matrix 
11.   end for  
12. end for   
 
3.2. Node identification for Hardware Trojan insertion 
Transition probability value plays a very significant analysis in inserting the Trojan module to the 
circuit. The internal nodes with low transition probability (TP) are more susceptible for triggering the Trojan 
and payload. It is also highly likely that an adversary might insert a Hardware Trojan (HT) in these low TP 
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nodes because of their low switching activities, which triggers the Trojan module in rare instances.  
The algorithm 2 provides the calculation for transition probability. The probability calculation for basic logic 
gates [5] is expressed as 
 
𝑂𝑃(1) = ⁡𝐼𝑁1(1) ∗ 𝐼𝑁2(1)(1)                                                                                                (1) 
 
𝑂𝑃⁡(0) ⁡= ⁡𝐼𝑁1(0) ⁡+ ⁡𝐼𝑁2(0)⁡–⁡[𝐼𝑁1(0) ⁡∗ ⁡𝐼𝑁2(0)]                                                            (2) 
 
The Hardware Trojans such as combinational and 3 bit counter sequential modules are designed, 
which get activated at rare conditions and cause changes in the performance of the chosen benchmark 
circuits. Nodes with low Transition Probability (TP) and high connectivity are selected and the designed 
Hardware Trojan (HT) modules are inserted at these nodes for validation process. 
 
Algorithm 2. Calculating Transition probability value for each net 
Input: Circuit net-list, module list of the circuit. 
Output: Transition probability (TP) values. 
Step1: Scan the module list. xlsx file. 
Step2: Extract the primary input (PI), output (PO) and the gates of the circuit. 
Step3: Initialise the probability of primary inputs nets as 0.5. 
Step4: Determine the net index.  
Step5: If (net index = net index of PI) then 
Step6:      Store the TP values in an array 
Step7:      else 
Step8:      for each net in the net- list do 
Step9:          Find the type of gate and index values of input 
Step10:        Calculate the probability at the output net according to the gate type  
Step11:        Calculate the transition probability values for each net  
Step12:        Store nets transition probability in ascending order. 
Step13:     end for  
Step14: end if 
 
3.3. Logic testing 
Logic testing is performed by comparing the logic values at the nodes in the golden circuit with that 
of the Trojan ICcircuit for all possible test patterns obtained from proposed algorithm. The Table 1 provides 
the comparison of the logic values for Trojan infected and golden circuit. A combinational type of Trojan is 
inserted in the low transition probability node and the logic variations in the nets are observed which 
indicates the presence of Trojan module. 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of output function in Logic Testing 
Input 
Pattern 
C17 Golden C17 Trojan circuit 
Internal Nodes Primary output Internal Nodes Primary output 
N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
7 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
14 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
In-order to validate the efficiency of detection of Hardware Trojan using compressive sensing, 
metrics such as True Positive Rate (TPR) and Probability of detection (PD) [5] are applied to the circuit 
under test. In case of binary classification, the True positive (TR) value identifies the number of Trojan nets 
as malicious nets itself and the False negative (FN) values shows the number of Trojan nets identified as 
normal nets by mistake.  
 
3.4. Power analysis 
The compressed test set generated from the proposed algorithm are forced to the design under test at 
different time windows. A Synopsys prime time tool is used to determine the leakage power for every test 
vector. The hardware Trojan chosen for this analysis is a three bit counter and its impact will be noticed only 
during certain clock cycle. The observed power profile will vary for the Trojan IC at some time stamp 
whereas it is unaltered for the Trojan free IC. The variation of the power profile is mainly due to the 
application of certain test sets which activates the Trojan module. This method of side channel approach for 
detecting Trojan module does not requires any golden net list as reference circuit. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The proposed methodology is validated using ISCAS 85 combinational benchmark circuits with 
combinational and sequential Trojan modules, which alters the functionality of the circuit. Table 2 lists the 
comparison of test vector reduction for ISCAS bench mark circuits for conventional ATPG patterns and 
proposed compressive sensing (CS) approach. It is observed that the proposed test set using CS achieves an 
average test length reduction of 88.6%, while maximizing the Trojan triggering rate. The run time for 
executing this algorithm is also computed.  
 
 
Table 2. Test pattern reduction using CS algorithm 
Bench mark 
circuits 




Test vectors using 
ATPG (N) 
Test vectors 





C17 5 25 7 x 5 3 x 5 99.4 0.0182 
C432 36 236 63 x 36 23 x 36 92.33 0.587 
C499 41 241 56 x 41 19x41 93.66 0.79 
C880 60 260 148 x 60 55 x 60 81.66 1.003 
C1355 41 241 100 x 41 37 x 41 87.66 0.178 
C3540 50 250 265 x 50 97 x 50 70.6 0.162 
C6288 32 232 34 x 32 13 x 32 95.6 1.56 
 
 
The Transition Probability (TP) values are evaluated for different bench mark circuits and low TP 
values along with the high connectivity nodes are also listed in the Table 3. The Low TP values are 
considered as potential nodes and these nodes are chosen by the attackers at the design site to introduce the 
Trojan gate for malicious intention. For the simulation of power profile some of the locations are considered 
for Trojan insertion and the results are validated for detection process. 
 
 
Table 3. Target nodes identification using Transition Probability values 
 
 
The Comparison of the detection probability metrics such as True Positive Rate (TRP) and trigger 
coverage for the conventional test generation ATPG and the proposed compressive sensing approach is 
analyzed in Table 4. The Trojan is inserted at different nodes with low TP and it is observed that the test 
vector obtained by proposed CS approach is capable of determining the Trojan module more effectively 
during logic testing. It is also observed that reduced test pattern provides high  trojan triggering coverage 
compared to ATPG patterns, which proves the CS approach has revealed the optimal test vectors for the 
triggering the Trojan module and improves the detection rate. 
Table 5 lists the Probability of Detection (PD) rate for the ISCAS benchmark circuit. Key nodes 
with low TP values are selected for Trojan insertion and the results are validated. It is observed that for most 
of the pattern the detection probability is high, which indicates the effective test set generated by the 
proposed algorithm, while maximizing the Trojan detection rate. 
The Figure 3 shows the Power signature for various ISCAS benchmark circuits. A sequential 3-bit 
counter is designed in order to observe the variation of power profile during specific clock pulse to validate 
the Trojan presence. The proposed CS test set is applied to circuit under test and the power profile is 
measured for different time stamps. It is observed that the value of the measured power overlaps for Trojan 
free circuit and for some set of test patterns it shows some variation in power for Trojan infected circuits. The 
proposed sparse test patterns triggers sequential Trojan and is reflected by non-overlapping of power profile 





Nodes with low TP value High Connectivity nodes 












N289, N325, N312, N372, N378, N379. 
C880 0.0000610314 
N507, N508, N509, N510, N511, 






N794, N797, N800, N803,N806,N812, 
N815,N996 
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Proposed  CS Algorithm patterns ATPG Patterns 
Trigger 
Coverage 













7 66.66 2 1 0.667 28.57 2 5 0.285 
9 33.33 1 2 0.333 14.28 1 6 0.142 
7 ,9 100 2 1 0.667 42.85 2 5 0.285 
C432 
300 95.65 3 20 0.131 49.2 4 59 0.0634 
301 95.65 2 21 0.0869 44.44 2 61 0.0317 
300, 301 95.65 3 20 0.131 53.96 4 59 0.0634 
C499 
 
378 94.73 6 13 0.3157 83.92 8 48 0.143 
379 94.73 6 13 0.3157 82.14 8 48 0.143 
378, 379 100 6 13 0.3157 91.07 8 48 0.143 
C880 
507 94.54 51 4 0.927 39.18 57 91 0.385 
511 94.54 47 8 0.855 39.18 53 95 0.358 
507, 511 94.54 52 3 0.945 39.18 58 90 0.391 
C1355 
996 91.89 34 3 0.919 66 66 34 0.66 
1016 89.18 33 4 0.892 65 65 35 0.65 
996,1016 94.59 35 2 0.946 73 73 27 0.73 
 
 




patterns using CS 






1/3 1 yes 33.33% 
2/3 2 no 66.66% 
C499 
11/19 3 yes 100% 
7/19 2 yes 66.66% 
1/19 0 no 0% 
C880 
46/55 3 yes 100% 
4/55 2 yes 66.66% 
2/55 1 yes 33.33% 
3/55 0 no 0% 
C3540 
27/43 3 yes 100% 
16/43 2 yes 66.66% 
C6288 
8/13 3 yes 100% 














Figure 3. Measurement of power profile at different time windows 
(a) C432 Trojan inserted circuit, (b) C432 circuit, (c) C499 Trojan inserted circuit, (d) C499 circuit 
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Figure 3. Measurement of power profile at different time windows 
(e) C1355 Trojan inserted circuit, (f) C1355 circuit 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this work a compressive sensing approach based on Trojan detection is presented, where the 
concept of sparsifying all possible input vectors is used to generate the revealing test vector which triggers 
the Trojan module. The simulation is done on ISCAS’85 bench mark circuit, which shows the proposed CS 
based test set generation approach which achieves about 88.6% reduction in test lenght over conventional test 
set. The detection of hardware Trojan is ensured by validating the probability of detection and trigger 
coverage metrics. The proposed detection approach improves the test quality by minimizing the test length 
and maximizing the triggering rate. He side channel parameter are analysed for the CS based test patterns at 
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